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According to much of the recent psychological literature on memory, Bartlett 
should be credited with the insight that remembering can never be accurate 
but is, instead, more or less of a distortion (a view to which many modern 
authors themselves seem to subscribe).  In the present paper, we argue that 
Bartlett did not himself provide such an unqualified account of remembering.  
Although he sought to challenge the idea that remembering is largely an 
accurate record of past events, he did not maintain that it is always inaccurate.  
Despite unqualified claims by Bartlett to the contrary, neither his own 
experiments nor his theoretical position warrant the conclusion that 
remembering is inherently unreliable.  Indeed, as we explain, Bartlett himself 
provides several examples of impressively detailed and accurate recall, and 
sought to explain them within the framework of his schema theory. 
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‘I did not say, I think I did not imply that literal retrieval is impossible, but 
I did imply that it requires special constricting conditions’ (Bartlett, 1968, 
cited in Crampton, 1978; p. 340). 
 
Sir Frederic Bartlett is widely regarded as one of the early pioneers of modern 
cognitive psychology.  After a negative reaction around the time of his death 
(e.g. Zangwill, 1972), Bartlett's well-known text, Remembering (1932), has 
come to be widely accepted as having very direct relevance to current-day 
cognitive psychology.  Not only has Bartlett remained one of the most widely 
cited authors in cognitive psychology, but there is also general agreement 
about his major contribution to modern psychology: the proposal that 
remembering is not reproductive, but reconstructive and hence inherently 
unreliable. 
 
In this paper we first examine how Bartlett's work is represented in modern 
textbooks and more specialist research literature.  Then we consider how 
Bartlett himself represented his own theory and findings.  Finally, we argue 
that not only the subsequent commentaries, but also Bartlett himself, have 
misremembered the true implications of Bartlett's findings and theory. 
 
THE "TEXTBOOK BARTLETT". 
Theoretical approaches to memory have ranged along a number of polarities, 
including procedural vs. representational, explicit vs. implicit, declarative vs. 
non-declarative, and cognitive vs. social.  But perhaps one of the most basic 
polarities has been that between reproductive and reconstructive theories.  
The reproductive theory, that memory may be based on 'unalterable traces', is 
typically identified with Freud: 
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The way the memory behaves in dreams is certainly most important for 
any theory of memory in general.  It teaches us that 'nothing that is once 
mentally our own can ever be entirely lost' (Scholz [1887], p. 34).  Or, as 
Delboeuf [1885] puts it, 'que tout impression même la plus insignificante, 
laisse une trace inaltérable, indéfinement susceptible de repaître au jour,' 
[every impression, even the most insignificant, leaves an unalterable trace 
indefinitely capable of coming out into the open] a conclusion which so 
many other - pathological - phenomena of the psychic life likewise force us 
to make (Freud, 1900/1976, p. 19.) 
The diametrically opposed position, that memory is inherently reconstructive, 
is typically identified with Bartlett and his classic text, Remembering (1932).  
This reading of Bartlett is certainly consistent with the general subjectivistic 
emphasis within modern cognitive psychology upon the active, transformative 
role of the 'knower'.  Interestingly, it has also proved highly consistent with an 
apparently radical alternative to cognitivism, namely social constructivism 
(Bloor, 2000). 
Neisser, the foremost contemporary exponent of the constructivist approach to 
memory, has acknowledged his debt to Bartlett over many years: 
Following Bartlett, I myself have often metaphorically described 
memories as constructions, that is, as products that are skilfully built 
from available parts to serve specific purposes.  Because they are 
constructions rather than copies, they can often be seriously mistaken 
even when the individual is explicitly aiming at correspondence.  
(Neisser, 1996, p.204)1 
 
                                            
1
 Neisser (1967, p. 285) has used the analogy of reconstructing a dinosaur from a few bone chips.  However, such 
metaphors from palaeontology or archaeology can have quite different implications depending on the supposed status of 
'the bone chips' or archaeological remains (see Larsen, 1987). 
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In many psychological texts on memory, one can find largely unqualified 
endorsements of Bartlett's theory of reconstructive memory as it has been 
widely represented.  Here are some recent examples: 
 
Much of what we recall from long-term memory is not an accurate 
representation of what actually happened previously … An early 
experiment by Bartlett (1932) called attention to this fact … Bartlett 
concluded that people remember only a few striking details of an 
experience and that during recall they reconstruct the missing portions in 
accordance with their own expectations. (Carlson, Buskist & Martin, 2000, 
p. 265). 
 
[Bartlett] showed that when people read a story, their comprehension 
and remembering of it are not faithful renderings.  They are based on 
idiosyncratic and societal schemas available to the reader; these 
schemas assimilate salient details and the emotional tone of a story 
and can then, if remembering is required, generate a construction of it 
that is more or less inaccurate.  (Oatley, 1999, p. 102.) 
 
Bartlett argued that the process of retrieval involves reconstruction, 
which is influenced by the frameworks that people already have in their 
heads.  So memory, just like perception, is both selective and 
interpretive.  It involves construction as well as reconstruction.  (Butler 
& McManus, 1998, p. 35.) 
 
Forgetting is the loss of information from any point in the memory process 
or memory system.  William James suggested that in real life, in spite of 
occasional surprises, most of what happens is actually forgotten.  Sir 
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Frederic Bartlett indicated that memory is hardly ever exact. (Anderson, 
1996, p. 358) 
 
An important concept to grasp in the understanding of long-term memory 
is that of the schema.  Memory schemas, which are similar but not 
identical to the sense in which Piaget used them, they are discrete units of 
information which relate to a typical object or event in the world.  The 
schema framework was first put forward by Frederick Bartlett (1932), who 
was interested in the ways in which memory was a construction rather 
than a copy of the information that was presented. (Coulson, 1995, p. 92) 
Bartlett has also been widely cited in the more specialised literature, for example 
on hypnotically-induced memories: 
 
The role of cognitive schemata is also underscored by another principle 
(Bartlett, 1932) … In the final analysis, memory is not so much like reading 
a book as it is like writing one from fragmentary notes.  The reconstruction 
principle is of utmost important importance in the present context because 
it means that any particular memory is only partly derived from trace 
information encoded at the time of the event. (Kihlstrom, 1994; see also 
Kihlstrom, 1998) 
Most conspicuously, Bartlett's work on remembering figures centrally in the 
recent debates about "recovered memories" (i.e. claims made by adults, often, 
but not exclusively, as a consequence of therapy, about having been sexually 
abused in their childhood; see Lindsay & Read, 1994; Lindsay & Briere, 1997).  
To a remarkable extent, these debates have come to revolve around a 
theoretical contrast between two views of memory (Brewin & Andrews, 1997): is 
memory based on 'unalterable traces' or is it inherently reconstructive and hence 
unreliable?  This first position has (rightly or wrongly) been typically identified 
  7 
with Freud.  The diametrically opposed position, that memory is inherently 
reconstructive, has been consistently attributed to Bartlett (1932).  For example, 
Crews, a persistent and searching critic of Freud and psychotherapy, has drawn 
an explicit contrast between the Freudian notion of a permanent store of memory 
and Bartlett's theory (e.g. Crews, 1994). 
The reconstructive interpretation of memory fuels much of the argument from the 
proponents of the so-called ‘false memory syndrome’.  Pendergrast, author of the 
popular Victims of Memory (1996), a book charting the rise of the recovered 
memory movement and the false memory syndrome, invokes Bartlett in support 
of his case: 
Bartlett concluded that our memories generally serve us well, not by 
offering photographic recall, but by selectively sampling experience and 
molding it so that out lives have purpose and meaning. ...  Bartlett was 
right when he talked about a 'schema' to which the mind refers. Whenever 
we remember something we literally reconstruct it, grabbing tiny bits of 
imagery and information from millions of neurons that interconnect in a 
vast and complex web.  Until that moment the memory cannot be said to 
exist at all.  (Pendergrast, 1996, pp. 54 & 84.) 
The implication, of course, is that if memory is intrinsically reconstructive and 
unreliable then ‘false memories’ must be the rule rather than the exception. 
Bartlett's text is also widely invoked in the academic literature on recovered 
memory to support “one of the fundamental findings of cognitive psychology over 
the last 50 years”, namely that memory is "highly susceptible to change” 
(Schooler, Bendiksen & Ambadar, 1997, p. 254).  Neisser himself has made an 
explicit connection between the idea of reconstructive memory (which as we 
have seen he credits to Bartlett) and the 'false memory syndrome': 
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Images and memories are never simply 'observed' by the patient and then 
'reported' to the analyst, as the archaeological metaphor would imply.  
They are always constructs, shaped by the shared need to establish a 
psychoanalytically satisfactory narrative of the patient's mental 
development. (Neisser, 1994, p.6; emphasis added) 
 
There is, then, both in the textbooks and in the more specialist literature, a 
wide consensus concerning Bartlett's views on memory: remembering is 
intrinsically reconstructive and hence inevitably unreliable.  Indeed, even those 
rare researchers who have, over the years, challenged Bartlett's theory as an 
adequate account of remembering, nevertheless accept the textbook view of 
Bartlett's theory as an accurate representation of the target of their criticism 
(e.g. Wynn & Logie, 1998; Kintsch, 1995; Gauld & Stephenson, 1967).  As we 
will now explain, much of what Bartlett himself says about his findings and 
theory does seem to support the "Textbook Bartlett". 
 
BARTLETT ON BARTLETT 
 
Bartlett's empirical studies. 
 
As Bartlett himself acknowledged, the experimental procedure he adopted might 
well have encouraged both conservation and transformation.  On the one hand, 
Bartlett notes that the very act of taking part in an experiment might well result in 
participants producing more accurate reproductions: 
 
A subject who takes part in an experiment is, as a rule, more careful 
than usual, and hence we may reasonably suppose that the changes 
effected by Serial Reproduction in the course of the social intercourse 
of daily life will probably occur yet more easily and be yet more striking 
  9 
than those which have been illustrated in the present tests. (Bartlett, 
1932, p. 175) 
 
Yet he also acknowledges that his methodology would be also likely to 
encourage the participants to transform the stimulus material: 
 
I think it certain that experimental conditions themselves very greatly 
favour abbreviation (Bartlett, 1932, p. 174). 
 
It has been noted that his choice of stimulus material was often far from 
'ecologically valid'.  As Roediger, Bergman and Meade (2000, p. 117) have 
complained, The War of the Ghosts is "about as similar to normal prose as 
Ebbinghaus's .. nonsense syllables are to words."  But this was hardly an 
oversight on Bartlett's part.  He chose such material precisely because it was 
unusual and exotic: 
 
The folk stories were used … because they are predominantly a type of 
material which passes very rapidly from one group to another; because 
most subjects regard it as interesting in itself; because stories can 
easily be chosen which were fashioned in a social environment very 
different from that of any social group that is likely to yield subjects for a 
given experiment; and because, both as to form and as to content, they 
frequently contain characters which would normally be expected to 
undergo much change in the course of transmission (Bartlett, 1932, p. 
119).2 
 
                                            
2
   Bartlett did also use more familiar material in some of his experiments (Bartlett, 1932, pp. 146-154) and still found 
evidence of transformations. 
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Furthermore, contrary to some accounts of his work (see Davis, 1996, for 
examples), Bartlett's own methodology was far from representative of how 
information is normally conveyed from one person to another.  As Edwards and 
Middleton (1987) note: 
 
if we … consider the essential nature of text, of discourse generally and of 
relations between experiencing and remembering, it is immediately clear 
that serial reproduction studies are unlike much of everyday remembering. 
(Edwards & Middleton, 1987, p. 83; see also Davis, 1996.) 
 
Yet Bartlett appears to have been well aware that his methodology was not a 
perfect analogue for the everyday transmission of information.  But unlike his 
choice of stimulus material (which, as we will shortly explain very much fitted in to 
his initial research agenda) he never properly explained why in his experiments 
"the subjects effected their reproduction … as isolated individuals than definitely 
as members of a group" (Bartlett, 1920, pp. 30-31).  As he conceded in his 1932 
book: 
To write out a story which has been read is a very different matter from 
retelling to auditors a story which has been heard.  The social stimulus, 
which is the main determinant of form in the latter case, is almost 
absent from the former. (Bartlett, 1932, p. 174.) 
 
Given the special conditions involved in Bartlett's empirical studies, such as the 
use of unusual material and its written transmission, what kind of conclusions did 
he himself try to draw from them?  Throughout his book, Bartlett presents a 
series of summaries of the implications of his experiments on remembering.  
Sometimes his conclusions are quite categorical, that memory is always subject 
to distortion: 
  11
Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless and 
fragmentary traces.  It is an imaginative reconstruction, or construction, 
built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass of 
organised past reactions or experience and to a little outstanding detail 
which commonly appears in image or in language form.  It is thus hardly 
ever really exact, even in the most rudimentary cases of rote 
recapitulation, and it is not at all important that it should be so (Bartlett, 
1932, p. 213). 
 
Sometimes, however, such seemingly unqualified claims are hedged: 
It looks as if what is said to be reproduced is, far more generally than is 
commonly admitted, really a construction, serving to justify whatever 
impression may have been left by the original (Bartlett, 1932, p. 176, 
emphasis added). 
 
Yet such unqualified conclusions about the unreliable nature of remembering 
could hardly be justified on the basis of his studies.  Why then did Bartlett present 
the results of his empirical studies in such a seemingly one-sided and misleading 
way?  Remembering had taken a very long time to write (it was initially planned 
as a text on conventionalization), and, when he was appointed as the first 
Professor of Psychology at Cambridge in 1931, Bartlett still had a reputation to 
establish.  So it is perhaps understandable that Bartlett was tempted to over-
state his case.  Indeed, he was also remarkably grudging about acknowledging 
the work of previous researchers (see Davis, 1996; Kintsch, 1995; Roediger, 
Wheeler & Rajaram, 1993; Roediger et al., 2000).  He certainly wished to 
challenge what he took to be the standard view (attributed by Bartlett to Freud) 
that memories form a "static mass" (Bartlett, 1932, p. 15).  However, his findings, 
we have argued, do not justify the conclusion that remembering is always 
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unreliable, but only the more moderate claim that it is usually more 'schematic' 
"than is commonly admitted". 
 
Bartlett's theoretical approach to remembering. 
So far we have considered Bartlett's findings, and the unjustified claims he 
sometimes makes that prove that remembering is inherently unreliable.   We now 
consider Bartlett's accounts of his own theory. 
 
Bartlett adopted a biological or functional approach to the study of remembering, 
and insisted that it would be maladaptive for the behaviour of an organism to be 
rigidly tied to its past experiences.  As Bartlett put it, the capacity to be influenced 
by past reactions conflicts with "the demand, issued by a diverse and constantly 
changing environment, for adaptability, fluidity and variety of response" (Bartlett, 
1932, p. 218).  This consideration alone would seem to justify Bartlett's claim that 
accurate recall "is an artificial construction of the armchair or of the laboratory" 
(Bartlett, 1932, p. 15).  Yet, as Bartlett also eventually acknowledged, adaptation 
demands both innovation and conservation.  After all, environments are not 
completely chaotic, "[the] external environment .. partially changes and in part 
persists, so that it demands a variable adjustment, yet never permits an entirely 
new start" (Bartlett, 1932, p. 224; emphasis added.)   
 
Bartlett’s schema theory of remembering was not only an account of how 
remembered material might become transformed, but also a theory of retention.  
Bartlett had originally conducted most of his empirical studies years before the 
appearance of his 1932 book, in order to study the psychological basis of cultural 
change, and the effects of contact between cultures and how material becomes 
assimilated into a new context.  Yet, in contrast to his later apparent emphasis 
upon change, he had initially regarded the influence of the immediate cultural 
context as essentially conservative.  As he put it in his 1923 book, Psychology 
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and Primitive Culture, the possibilities for any individual to introduce radical 
change is ‘very much limited’: 
 
He may analyze; he may be the source of much reduplication; he may 
make new patterns of the old material; he may introduce peculiar 
interpretations; but in the actual invention of new detail he is practically 
helpless, unless he has access to communities outside his own and of a 
different culture.  It is this, beyond anything else, which ... acts as the spur 
to those constructive processes as a result of which new forms of social 
organization may be achieved; new cultures produced; and radical 
changes brought into being. (Bartlett, 1923, p. 238; emphasis added) 
 
Doubtless stories change from time to time.  They suffer transformation as 
they pass from people to people.  Yet it remains true that within a given 
group they are often remarkably persistent.  Not only does their theme 
remain unaltered, but the very terms in which the story is told suffer but 
slight change.  (Bartlett, 1923, pp. 63-64, emphasis added; cf. Goody, 
1998.) 
 
The experiments reported in Remembering were initially conceived and designed 
to provide the psychological underpinning for the anthropological doctrine of 
diffusionism.  According to this doctrine (promoted by W.H.R. Rivers, Grafton 
Elliot Smith and W. J. Perry), progressive change within groups is not 
spontaneous but provoked by "connexion" between cultures (Bartlett, 1932, pp. 
243, 273 & 289; see also Kuklick, 1991; Kashima, 2000)3.  
 
                                            
3
 In the late nineteenth century the anthropologist A. C. Haddon had already been promoting diffusionism at Cambridge 
(see Haddon, 1895; Costall, 1991). 
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Although, by 1932, Bartlett had come to emphasise creativity and distortion 
rather than conservation in memory, and downplay the artificial nature of the 
materials used in his own experiments, the logic of his schema theory remained 
unchanged.  Transformation and conservation are just two sides of the same 
coin: when the material to be remembered does not conform to available 
schemas but can nevertheless be assimilated it will be transformed; otherwise, it 
should persist relatively unchanged.  Furthermore, both at the level of the 
individual or the social, the effect of the process of reconstruction is ultimately 
conservative: 
 
the final product approaches stability, that of the determined and relatively 
fixed individual memory in the one case, and that of the social 
conventionalisation in the other (Bartlett, 1932, p. 309; emphasis added.) 
Bartlett emphatically and convincingly challenged “pure trace theory” (e.g. 
Bartlett, 1932, p. 197), but he was far from embarrassed by evidence of 
accurate recall, not even cases which he himself admitted seemed to demand 
the concept of trace. Take his example of a woman who, having taken part in 
his early experiments, was able to recall two of the proper names from The 
War of the Ghosts some ten years after she was first tested.  Although Bartlett 
noted that her vivid recall of proper names was unusual, he went on to assert 
that "the immediate return of certain detail is common enough and it certainly 
looks very much like the direct re-excitation of certain traces" (Bartlett, 1932, p. 
209).  According to Bartlett, such vivid detail not only provides the basis of the 
reconstruction, but can also be "picked out" of schemata, (e.g. Bartlett, 1932, 
pp. 209 & 303), and reinstated "with much if not all of its individuality 
unimpaired" (Bartlett, 1932, p. 219). 
However, as Neisser himself noted, in addition to the supplementation of the 
schema concept by that of the trace, Bartlett also found resources within the 
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schema concept itself to explain how recall, such as that of the African 
herdsmen, could be achieved with “astonishing accuracy”.  Such recall might 
be based upon "detailed and articulate schemata into which new material can 
be fitted" (Neisser, 1967, p. 288).  Furthermore, as we have seen, the schema 
concept is also essential to Bartlett’s account of the persistent retention of 
novel details, and of rote remembering. 
 
BARTLETT'S EXAMPLES OF ACCURACY IN RECALL. 
So far, we have noted how Bartlett's summaries of his theoretical position and 
the implications of his empirical findings are often misleading.  According to 
the logic of his theory, remembering should be both transformative and 
conservative.  Furthermore, his empirical studies could not in themselves 
justify the general conclusion that remembering is inevitably subject to error.  
In fact, within his 1932 book, Bartlett himself provides several examples of 
accurate recall.  We now consider each of these in turn. 
1.  The retention of meaningless details.  When Bartlett summarised the 
results of his experiments on the serial reproduction of pictorial material, he 
noted "a strong tendency to preserve apparently trivial or disconnected detail 
of a non-representative character or in a non-representative setting" (Bartlett, 
1932, p. 185; see also p. 117 on the survival of "novel detail").  He returns to 
this issue in his chapter on "Conventionalization", where he notes how, within 
social groups, "small features often ... resist change in an astonishing manner" 
(Bartlett, 1932, p. 274).  He concluded that Elliot Smith and W.J. Perry were 
right, therefore, to rely upon such resistant features as evidence for their 
theory of contact between distant cultures and diffusion of motifs.  Thus, 
according to Bartlett, details not readily assimilated to an existing schema 
should be resistant to change. 
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2. The schematic determination of rote memory.  According to Bartlett, 
transformation in recall is not the direct consequence of schematic 
determination, but the need - under certain circumstances - for the person to 
reconstruct that schema.  When, however, the schema is well established, and 
the environment relatively stable or predictable, the schema is best left 
"undisturbed" (Bartlett, 1932, p. 203).  Bartlett begins his discussion of rote 
memory with the example of an old man, whose adventures are over, 
engaging in "almost word-perfect reminiscence" (Bartlett, 1932, p. 203).  But, 
as Bartlett goes on to explain, such rote remembering is not restricted to those 
in their dotage: 
There is the low-level mental life which, being cut off from all but a few 
often-repeated environmental stimuli, shows unusual rote memory.  All 
of us, in reference to some of our 'schemata', have probably completed 
the model and now merely retain it by repetition.  All relatively low-level 
remembering tends, in fact, to be rote remembering, and rote 
remembering is nothing but the repetition of a series of reactions in the 
order in which they originally occurred. (Bartlett, 1932, p. 203, see also 
p. 264). 
In his account of schemata, Bartlett, like Henry Head, emphasised the 
importance of their temporal structure.  He returned to this issue when, later in 
his book, he came to consider how cultures help make things memorable, by 
imposing rhythmic structure on the material to be remembered, and hence 
ensure that "the order of reaction" associated with various rituals can be 
"jealously preserved" (Bartlett, 1932, p. 290). 
3. Sonia Kovalesky.  Bartlett included an example of a memory prodigy, Sonia 
Kovalesky (Bartlett, 1932, p. 230).  As a young child in her nursery, she had 
been surrounded by sheets of paper on the walls which were covered with 
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mathematical formulae.  Although they were meaningless to her at the time, 
she had been fascinated by them, and when she began her studies in calculus 
their meaning is supposed to have immediately dawned upon her.  In his 
discussion of this case, it is clear that Bartlett accepted such remarkably 
persistent and detailed retention as well within the bounds of possibility. 
4. The "wonderful memory" of the Bantu.  Of the many examples Bartlett 
provides of accurate recall, those based on his visit to South Africa are 
perhaps the best known (see Neisser, 1967, p. 288; Cole, 1996, pp. 58-60).  
First, there are the examples of rote recall.  Initially, he attributes this form of 
remembering to an individual limitation of the rememberer, "a person of few 
interests, and those largely unorganised and concrete in nature" (Bartlett, 
1932, p. 265).  However, Bartlett also opened up a social dimension, referring 
to a particular form of society, which had time for, and encouraged, detailed 
recall: 
there is behind [rote recital] the drive of a group with plenty of time, in a 
sphere of relatively uncoordinated interest, where everything that 
happens is about as interesting as everything else, and where, 
consequently, a full recital is socially approved. (Bartlett, 1932, p. 266). 
Bartlett's social account of reproductive remembering relates to a more 
general, though still neglected, theme in his 1932 book: remembering as a 
social activity dependent upon the "social position of the narrator" and his or 
her relation to the group from which the "audience" is drawn (Bartlett, 1932, p. 
266; see Edwards & Middleton, 1987).4  As Bartlett appreciated, detailed 
                                            
4
 According to Edwards and Middleton (1987) and also Douglas (1986), remembering should be regarded a process 
occurring between people and they focus on how people in conversations construct accounts of events and the 




attention to accuracy may not only be inappropriate but positively subversive.  
Paradoxically, the example he gives is based upon a trial in Swaziland, where 
(on the face of it) one might suppose that careful attention to accurate detail 
would be an advantage: 
The Magistrate: Now tell me how you got that knock on the head. 
 
The Woman: Well, I got up at daybreak and I did ... (here followed a 
long list of things done, and of people met, and things said). 
There we went to so and so's kraal and we ... (further lists here) and 
had some beer, and so and so said ... 
 
The Magistrate: Never mind about that.  I don't want to know anything 
except how you got the knock on the head. 
 
The Woman: All right, all right.  I am coming to that. I have not got there 
yet.  And so I said to so and so ... (there followed again a great deal of 
conversational and other detail).  And then after that we went on to so 
and so's kraal. 
 
The Magistrate: You look here; if we go on like this we shall take all 
day. What about that knock on the head? 
 
The Woman: Yes, all right, all right.  But I have not got there yet.  So we 
(on and on for a very long time relating all the initial details of the day).  
And then we went on to so and so's kraal ... and there was a dispute ... 
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and he knocked me on the head, and I died, and that is all I know.  
(Bartlett, 1932, pp. 264-265.)5 
To explain such rigid and meticulous recall, Bartlett wavers awkwardly 
between an individualistic account based on the idea of the "relatively 
primitive" or "poorly educated" mind, and a social explanation based on the 
generally undemanding expectations of the society for conciseness and 
relevance (Bartlett, 1932, p. 266).  In fact, Bartlett also acknowledged that the 
Swazi people are perfectly capable of adapting their recall to the situation at 
hand, and he provides examples where their recall is very much geared to the 
topic at hand, and yet still impressively detailed and accurate.  The most 
notable example of this "prodigiously retentive capacity" concerns a Swazi 
herdsman who could rapidly recall the most exact details of various cattle 
transactions (Bartlett, 1932, p. 250). 
It is important to note that Bartlett, in acknowledging the existence of rote 
remembering, on the one hand, and the kind of prodigious and flexible recall 
shown by the herdsman, on the other, did not regard these phenomena as 
exceptions to his theory (cf. Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Brewer, 2000).  In the 
first case, rote remembering, although not reconstructive, does nevertheless 
depend on a schema, but one whose temporal organisation is simply 
repeated, or "recapitulated" rather than flexibly deployed.  In the case of 
prodigious recall, specific individual or social interests give rise to "an active 
tendency to notice, retain and construct specifically along certain directions" 
(Bartlett, 1932, p. 255; emphasis added) be it the detailed recall of cattle 
transactions, or (to take an example closer to home) cricket scores in Wisden.  
Both reproductive and reconstructive remembering, according to Bartlett, are 
                                            
5 Admittedly, the witness's report of her own death is somewhat exaggerated, but there is no reason to question the 
accuracy of the other details. 
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dependent on schemata, both can be accurate, and, as Bartlett makes very 
clear, they are not restricted to any particular social group. 
5. Accurate recall of 'gist'. 
Finally, and very briefly, we should remember that Bartlett did not identify 
'accuracy' entirely with exactness of detail. As many commentators have 
noted, Bartlett's theory actually provides an alternative conception of 
'accuracy' in relation to memory of past events: 
In discussing the forms of memory errors it seems appropriate to start 
with the types of errors that Bartlett (1932) noted: gist and intrusions.  
The gist is the general understanding of what took place.  People tend 
to lose the specifics of an event in favor of a more general 
understanding of the experience.  For example, Bransford and Franks 
(1971) documented this in clever experiments … Such statements at 
the gist level are errors in the sense that they do not match what 
originally happened but they also preserve the basic idea and in that 
sense can be seen as correct (Hyman, 1999, pp. 231-232; emphasis 
added.) 
We have to admit it is difficult to find any very clear statements where Bartlett 
seems to be making this point explicitly, but this alternative conception of 
accuracy does logically follow from Bartlett's biological perspective on 
remembering.  In terms of adaptation, what matters is that the organism 
grasps the essence of a situation and not the intricate and incidental details. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In a scholarly commentary on schema theory, Brewer and Nakamura (1984) 
have argued that any “pure reconstructive schema theory” is untenable, since 
  21
it “allows no recall of unique episodic information from the original episode” (p. 
124).  In fact, when Neisser first promoted his constructivist approach, he 
conceded that even “if the constructive nature of memory is fully 
acknowledged, the fact remains that information about the past must be 
somehow stored and preserved for subsequent use” (Neisser, 1967, p. 280; 
see also pp. 170, 284, 288).   As Neisser (1967, p. 284) noted, "the metaphor 
of construction implies some raw material".  Indeed his own example of how a 
complete, if speculative, dinosaur is reconstructed from a few fossil bones 
clearly assumes that there is some definite "raw material" from which to work, 
as does Kihlstrom's (1994) account of reconstruction from "fragmentary 
notes".  Neisser goes on to suggest that any sensible schema theory 
(including Bartlett’s) must logically be a variant of trace theory (see also 
Larsen & Berntsen, 2000). 
So did Bartlett subscribe to a pure schema theory, or to a sensible schema 
theory instead?  To a large extent, our “re-reading” of Bartlett’s Remembering 
agrees with a searching account provided by Brewer and Nakamura (1984) 
some years ago.  As they themselves made very clear, there is a tension in 
Bartlett’s account of remembering.  They suggest that Bartlett had two 
theories: an “official” theory and a surreptitious “unofficial” theory.  According 
to Brewer and Nakamura, Bartlett's official theory is a pure schema theory; his 
unofficial theory is a variant of trace theory, and only that version seriously 
copes with the retention of specific, episodic information, by sneaking in the 
concept of “trace" (see also Brewer, 2000). 
 
We disagree with Brewer and Nakamura on just one of their points - their 
characterisation of Bartlett's sensible schema theory as his "unofficial" version.  
After all, that version and the various supporting observations constitute the 
main body of the book.  In contrast, the so-called official version appears 
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primarily in the summaries Bartlett provides of his findings and theory.  In our 
view, a more apt characterisation of the inconsistency in his work is in terms of 
a Bartlettian process of reproduction.  In his own summary 'reproductions', 
Bartlett often 'forgets' the details and qualifications for the sake of a more 
coherent and engaging 'story'.  Subsequent commentators, in turn, have 
mainly relied upon Bartlett's own "repeated reproduction" as the basis for their 
own "serial reproductions".  Thus, the fate of Bartlett's original message nicely 
demonstrates both sides of his sensible schema theory, that remembering can 
be both accurate or inaccurate depending on the conditions.  Whilst there was 
indeed a remarkable transformation in Bartlett's first reproduction of his 'story,' 
later reproductions have remained remarkably stable and resistant to change 
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